So to fully understand this article you will need to first read this: https://www.natesilver.net/p/24-reasons-that-trump-could-win. Nate Silver is still the best pollster America has. He is a liberal. These are his words on why his party may lose. Published 2½ weeks before they did lose. I would roughly divide these 24 reasons into 3 groups:

1. Situational issues specific to this election or Harris in particular
2. Running as an incumbent and people’s reflection on the result on the current administration
3. Fundamental party issues

So before we dive into this, let’s start with point 0. If you are on the Left and this result is “unbelievable” or “I just can’t understand it” then you do not have any of the problems listed by Nate. You have a reality problem. That is not a take down nor is it an insult, it is a technically correct analysis on the range of information you are allowing in. Trump and Harris have been tied for 3½ months in the polls. If two people are tied, then it is not a surprise when either one of them wins. You should have seen this coming, or at least admitted that there was a notable possibility of it. Feeling bad for a loss, that is human and you have my sympathy. Doubly so for those who have worked hard on campaigns only to lose. Not being able to contemplate how a loss is possible even when it is widely reported on and has been widely reported on for months? That is an unwillingness to accept information you don’t like.

It is ok to be wrong. Use it to get stronger. 

So Nate’s 24 points break down into 3 big blocks of ideas: 

1. 10 points specific to this election or Harris

2. 7 points specific to how the Biden Administration ran things, or more precisely how well some of their policies worked

3. 7 points about the Democratic party at large and where they fit in and aligns with the general US population

The first 10 we get to ignore. Those will not be an issue for Democrats in the next election cycle. If you want to scapegoat while refusing to get better, that is your list. Please don’t do that.

The next 7 are policy lessons that should be reviewed. CNN calls out Harris (https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/06/politics/harris-campaign-went-wrong/index.html) for struggling to answer the question “What would you do differently?”. That is a scapegoat. The problem is not how she answered her question but that many choices made collectively by Democrats over the last few years did not end up well. That means the party needs to reflect on those and make actual policy changes. A political party losing an election because they made bad decisions is the sign of a healthy democracy. Given the role of inflation in this election and the way Democrats treated Joe Manchin and economists who warned them on over spending, this black eye is earned.

Look, policy is hard. The history of public policy is filled with stories of unintended consequences. Some ideas are “broadly good ideas” but don’t work at a specific time or in a specific situation. That is a nuance that policy makers need to understand and always strive to get better at. Their desires for an idea do not outweigh the realities on the ground. Some level of moderation, timing, or situational adjustment are needed. Yes, still do the idea most of the time, just not all of the time if the situation does not match. Polarization makes this worse because what was a “broadly good idea” now gets turned into a political litmus test as if an edict from God. If you want to make minor modifications to it instead of bowing to it as an immutable truth then you are “not a real Democrat”. And that is the problem. When ideals and reality don’t agree, the side that votes against reality will quickly find reality voting against them in the next election. And that is the sign of a healthy democracy.

The final 7 issues are about the party at large… and almost all of them were said in 2016. Part of what happened here and has been happening is the Democrats were so busy hating Trump at the start of 2017, they just never reflected on their weaknesses and they elevated their most unlikable voices. You know, the exact same trick Karl Rove pulled during the Bush Administration. This is not hard to figure out. Open up the Democratic platform on one screen. Open up the Gallup poll on the other screen. Compare them and when 60%+ of the country disagrees with your position, that is where you need to moderate, not dig in.

Previously, the Democrats were slowly and steadily losing both the Labor vote and the minority vote. With the new male/female split among those in their 20’s, they may be losing the youth vote too. Now let me be clear: when I say “losing” what I mean is losing their advantage, i.e. they are now splitting the vote with Republicans instead of it being a source of surplus votes, i.e. part of their “Big Tent”. Latinos and the Asian voter were already becoming more diverse in their political views. We will have to wait and see the final polling numbers, but the number I am most curious to see is the ratio on how black men voted.

Either way, all of this adds up to the fact that the Democratic party is no longer the “Big Tent” party it once was. It is a medium tent party at best, and a medium tent party is just not good enough to win an election, not even against candidates as flawed as Donald Trump. For Democrats to win, they need to enlarge their tent again. That will take compromise on some issues, reprioritization on other issues, and flat out recanting some very unpopular ones. Those are going to be hard conversations for the party, but they are hard conversations that are long overdue. It is time for the Democrats to trade some tiny voting blocks in deep blue states to regain a footing in some much larger voting blocks in swing states.

… and you don’t have time to spare. As I am writing this the Senate is clearly going red and while the House is still in play… it is steadily filling up red as well. The Left needs to get strong if they want to divide power and block the worst of Trump in the second half. And that is the line. It is not “do I like this new policy position”, no the line is “does this position help win in the next election?”. That is the question that should have been asked in 2016 when Hilary lost. It should have been asked in 2020 when Biden won but with the thinnest of margins. The quality of character between Biden and Trump is massive, the margins should not have been that small. And now in 2024 the Democratic Party has once again being given the chance to take a fearless moral inventory of itself in the light of popular opinion.

I hope the Left learns. America needs it to.

So I just finished reading The Fall of the Rome Empire by Michael Grant, find it here: https://www.amazon.com/Fall-Roman-Empire-Michael-Grant/dp/0684829568

Great book and some really solid historical research. There are a couple of overarching ideas that I think go unchallenged when people talk on this topic and this book does a great job diving into those details and making those corrections. 

The east did not fall 

This is the biggest issue with this topic and I think one that gets overlooked in pop history. While we call the east roman empire the Byzantines, they did not. They called themselves Roman. And… yea, they really were roman. They had roman law, followed roman traditions, and provided support (often, not always) to the western empire. The Eastern Roman held on until the 15th century, although decline slowly started in the 11th century. Still, that is a much longer time than the 5th century fall of the west. 

Why does this matter? Because there are many, many narratives about why the western roman empire fell but many of those stories would also equally describe the east. So why didn’t the east fall? This is the problem with a lot of pop history on the subject and it can be a great slice of applied social science. Whenever someone says “the roman empire fell because of X, so we should stop doing that too” go and see if the eastern roman empire was doing it as well. If they were, then that didn’t cause the fall. One of the important ideas in science is to have falsifiable theories, i.e., theories that can be disproven. History has given us a great A/B test for those ideas. 

The west did not fall… it was conquered

This is another key idea. Normally when people talk about the fall of the roman empire they begin to look for internal problems or cultural issues… but Rome was conquered by an external party. Repeatedly. Maybe Rome was good but the Germanic tribes were just better? I think we still carry a bit of this anti-barbarian bias in our analysis but the fact of the matter is the various Germanic tribes built large, complex, and very capable military forces. That is not just “bravery” and strength from “hard living” or other nonsense ideas assigned to “barbarians” but that the Germanic tribes in particular had well practiced strategic adaptation by chieftains, reliable social structures, and a sizable iron industry. 

The highly localized structure of the Germanic Tribes made low level chieftains well practiced diplomats as they could not just ask a higher power but had to build coalitions at the local level. Adapting a specific tribe to a military niche or a flexible alliance were common. While Romans had their famous standardized legions, Germanic tribes often called up much larger forces with more mixed units. Within those masses would be smaller, more professional forces of specific types to counter specific military problems. 

As small independent tribes, these groups may side with one roman faction or another at different times. This well practiced political flexibility of leadership and variability of unit types often placed them as king makers at key points in time. They then leveraged that power into more land, more resources, and placed themselves into yet another, more powerful, king maker position. This was supported by a local iron industry that was both widespread and far larger than expected. For decades now archaeologists keep finding more and larger ancient iron forges from this era. This means Rome’s normal technological advantage was not there. 

The hard truth is… the Romans got out played while maintaining a high quality force. Even if many of Rome’s internal issues were addressed and more unity was in place, those Germanic tribes would still be at the gate, well armed, and in larger numbers. Any weakness in the passing of the crown, which was common in Rome, was aggressively exploited by the less formal Germanic chieftains who played those games with each other at all times. 

When they weren’t engaged in king making, they were ambushing Roman forces and making Rome fight not as their larger, complex but capable military, but as small units against smaller units where artillery or logistical advantage were not really a factor. As an ally, they were uniquely capable of eroding Rome from the inside. As an enemy, they were uniquely capable of eroding Rome from the outside. And because there were so many factions within the Germanic tribes, Rome was never fully sure which they were dealing with. This caused distrust, which undid Rome’s great power: their ability to integrate new peoples. The disunified Germanic tribes did not transition to Roman. 

A shift in cities 

It is also important to note the shifts that had already happened within the Roman Empire. Rome had already moved from being the king of cities to a 2nd or 3rd tier city below places like Constantinople, Alexandria, Corinth, and yes, even Carthage. These had grown to be larger and more important cities within the empire and seen as the choice governor appointments over places like Hispania or Gaul. 

Did Rome fall… or did Rome just move elsewhere? Both are true, but I think the latter makes more sense and is a far more honest reflection of the changes that had already happened. Much like the loss of Normandy did not end the English crown, being Roman no longer required Rome itself. And while no one was happy with Rome getting (partially) sacked, it was better that it happened to Rome than some of the other cities in the Empire. 

So let’s talk about that “(partially) sacked” part. The city and nearby estates were sacked, the Germanic tribes are partially-kind-of-mostly christian at this point. They did not sack the Vatican. There were sacred lines they did not cross. That line used to be the Rubicon, now it was the faith. While there was a shift between cities, there was also a shift away from government into faith. The church was becoming more important than the state, and while the state fell the church did not. At the time, this was generally seen as a good trade. Better to lose a 3rd rate but historic city and the riches within than lose the faith that binds us all together. 

Why we talk about imperial overstretch wrong today 

So this is the one that took me by surprise. Most references to imperial overstretch completely misunderstand that argument. Today, the argument is generally used by the left to point out the problems with having too large a military and getting yourself drawn into too many global conflicts.

But that is not actually the argument. The argument is that having a too large military causes a high tax burden and the high tax burden angers the people at all levels of society. Society then rewrites itself to push off the tax burden on to the other parts of society. This creates disunity by completely drowning one part of society in taxes, completely destroying it in the process so the burden falls on the next part, destroying it, and so on and so forth. At its core, this is not a liberal anti-military argument, it is a conservative anti-tax argument. 

The failure of local government 

And that tax burden was a real issue. Specifically in the roman case there was a class of people called curiales which acted as the local city council. They oversaw local laws, were responsible for local taxes, and governed the area as an inherited title. Early in the empire this was a good position to hold but as time went on it became the worst of both worlds. These local city councils were personally liable for taxes not collected. For most of the empire’s history, they always collected “extra tax” which they kept and were able to do so without angering too many people.. mostly. Now, they struggled to collect enough taxes. This forced the local government to be more and more heavy handed with the lower classes to raise taxes, it meant the higher nobility senators quickly wrote laws removing themselves from these titles, and there are many cases of lesser noble families bankrupting themselves due to having to pay the taxes from their own coffers year after year. 

As time went on, the emperor had to create new laws limiting the travel of Curiales, punishment for those who aided Curiales from flee from their inherited noble rank, and in 365 AD, Emperor Valen wrote an edict forbidding judges and city councils from granting the title of Curiales as punishments for criminal acts. Just imagine a government position so screwed up, that instead of running for the office to get the job, you got the job because you got in a bar fight and committed assault, and then the emperor steps in and says “no, that is too cruel a punishment for assault, just send him to the gladiatorial pits instead. That will only end his life, not that of all of his descendants”. 

How do you trust that Curiales to survey your land? To record your trades or legal proceedings? To entrust them with your children when they reach age for military training? During a trial? The roman countryside was built around these offices and they had completely fallen apart as a means of government. This is what bound the bulk of the countryside and estate to the city network that was the Roman Empire. 

Dropping out of society 

The Curiales were not the only people dropping out of the empire. Civic duty had collapsed, but like the Curiales each of those collapses was very specific and hard to find a good alternative for. The empire used to attract new soldiers with promises of land… but they ran out of land. Getting local titles seemed like a double edge sword so that could not be leveraged either. The edges of the empire were now either ocean, desert, or Germanic tribes so filling in gaps by recruiting outside the empire did not work any more. 

Social developments were also making this harder. Christian monks and scholarly orders had started to pop up. Many of these ran for the hills to get away from the sin of roman cities, thus removing many of the most educated people of the time from society. Small factions developed all along Christianity… but not in a splintering way. Each was independent, disconnected, and kept to themselves. They were friendly to each other, letters were exchanged and often monks would visit each other, but as a whole they left everyone else alone and were left alone. They did not challenge the authority of the Pope in Rome so the church did not really push back against them, even if they were a bit outside doctrine. 

The big take-away 

The final result of this book was great. A lot of the little fissures in roman society became even more clear while at the same time it never looked past the fundamental historical truths that it was taken down by a capable outside opponent and the east did not fall due to similar internal issues. It showed that at the end of the day, the western roman empire kind of just didn’t have much to offer its citizens anymore, or maybe what it had to offer was more toxic than beneficial. The things that bound the empire together stopped working and where simply never replaced, fixed, or improved upon. Maybe there are paths that could have saved them… but those are few and hard to see. 

The term “near peer competitor” is used constantly inside the beltway. It is the official code word in military and diplomatic circles for Russia and China. It is a theoretical idea for an enemy… that just happens to look exactly like Russia and China.

And near peer competitor is the justification of all kinds of defense spending. Want a new air superiority fighter? Make a reference to an unproven prototype with over hyped abilities. What more heavy tanks? Point at whatever armor is their newest model. Want a new piece of tech? Claim it is the wonder weapon to defeat some niche, low volume capability the other side has. Want to reorganize part of the Army? We need full scale penetration divisions to defeat the Russians! 

This has been the core of military dogma since the early days of the cold war. But does it hold up? Let’s take a minute to talk about what we are seeing happening, and not happening, in both Russia and China. 

Russia

How the mighty have fallen. Russia, the USSR before it, has been our traditional boogie man. That fear is broken, maybe more that it should be, but they are still seen as a shadow of their former self… unless you need funding for a new weapon. So without getting super deep into the Ukrainian conflict, what is the strength and capacity of the Russia military and are they really a near-peer? 

So first off, let’s address the elephant in the room. Right now the Russian Army is too much metal and not enough manpower. America has active units, where all people and gear are active, and reserve units, where all people and gear are reserved and are all called up at once as a group. Most western militarizes run this way. Ex-soviet militarizes do not. They intermix their regulars with whatever mix of conscripts, reserves, militia, etc. they leverage to fill out their forces. 

This is part of what got Russia in trouble in Ukraine. They had units built around having lots of infantry, lots of artillery, and a bit of everything else in them. Overall, a solid modern force structure. They were 60% regulars and 40% conscripts… on paper. In reality the conscript side was only half full. So when commanders were to get ready to invade, they had to figure out which parts of their force to undermanned since they were only at 80% strength. Then when it became time to actually go in, debate about the conscripts flared up, and Putin said to leave them behind. That means large, multifaceted units found themselves running at only 60% man power at the start of a war. 

Lower level commanders couldn’t under man a full spectrum capability at that point, they had to outright cut capacity and everyone did so in different ways. This is why some Russian units lacked infantry but others didn’t. Why some lacked anti-air, but others didn’t. Why some lacked trucks and logistics, but others didn’t. Those who lacked infantry for screening got hit with anti-tank missiles. Those who lacked anti-air (which was top of the line) explains why Ukraine (using old jets) still has an air force. Those who lacked logistics just ran out of gas while other forces traveled farther while maneuvering. This is also why Ukraine was able to capture some high end Russian equipment without a fight. It was left unmanned because commanders had more vehicles than drivers.

Russia still has a quality military. What they lack in a quantity military. They have confused large armor reserves and potential conscript numbers with actual military forces. When they put all their pieces together and do small deployments they actually do a really solid job. We have watched that for years in Syria. We see elements of advanced missile and air forces, just not a large scale and consistently sustainable one. Russia is very capable at small wars, just not at scale.

So does the US Air Force need a 6th generation air force to go toe to toe with the air power that is ineffective in Ukraine? No. Do we need a new fleet of 200 destroyers to go up against the Russian Navy when we now know that the Blacksea Flagship, Moskva, was in such bad shape that they sent it out with 2 of 3 anti-missile systems non-functional and the 3rd only partially functional. No, let’s hold off on ordering the new ships. Do we need to rescale and reorganize all of our army units to form high end penetration divisions specifically to counter the Russia armor because, surely there is no way some shoulder fire missiles, counter strikes on their limited logistical vehicles, and just poor maintenance will undo the great Russian armor push, right? Yea, we can pass on the reorg. 

There is a real chance Russia will rebuild itself over the winter and maybe that new force will be worth worrying over? Possible, but very, very difficult as alot of the trainers and other support forces were already deployed directly in combat. What we see now from Russia is well within America’s capacity as long as we remain prepositioned and ready. 

UPDATE: Russia’s February offenses have already started and, mostly, failed. Specifically 2 of 3 attacks were repelled and Bakmut continues to be a Pyrrhic victory in the making. 

But that is ok, because we now have a new boogie man. An up and coming boogie man. A lean-mean production machine boogie man coming after our buddies Taiwan, Japan, and Australia. And unlike Russia, they are still communist. So let’s talk about the new Soviet Union: … 

China

… or are they? Stalin and Xi are very different rulers with very different goals, very different countries, very different resources to leverage, very different domestic issues, and facing very different international problems. 

At its heights, the Soviet Union was spending around 24% of GDP on the military. That is how they kept pace with the West. They were 1/12 the size so they spent 12 times as much. China has spent a massive amount on a military build up so that must mean they are doing the same thing right? Well… no. China spends about 6% of GDP on the military. That has held steady since the 80’s. What has changed is not the slice, but the size of the pie. As China’s economy has massively grown, so has its military spending but on pace with other parts of China. Yes, Xi wants to modernize the Chinese military, but he also wants to modernize the Chinese education system and China’s scientific community. There are massive infrastructure projects modernizing China’s infrastructure in power, rail, and water. There are projects to modernize China’s space program, modernize China’s social safety net in rural areas, and modernize and regulate both social media and other digital platforms. Xi wants to modernize as much as he can… including the military. 

A few centuries ago, Prussia was described as not a state with an army but an army with a state. The Soviet Union wasn’t far from that idea, but China is. China is not driven by their military, they are driven by their need for economic growth. The thing at the center of Chinese diplomatic affairs, the thing that keeps unrest down, and the thing that moves the nation forward in the eyes of the Chinese people is their economy, not their military. The military is at best a plan B or even a plan C given how China is leveraging their investments to make indebted client states.

So we should just ignore China’s military reforms then? Actually I think we need to do the opposite. I think we need to understand them without over simplifying them. I think we need to figure out what they are transitioning to and where they can or may use those capabilities down the road.  Only then can we figure out not just if we need a “near-peer” response but what kinds of near-peer response would fit and which don’t. 

For the second question I am going to propose 6 different possible defense scenarios with China. Some are more likely than others and each has their own quarks to them both in terms of how they will play out, what allies would join in, and what kinds of military assets are needed… and which would be a struggle to use. Those scenarios are: 

1. Counter-Coup 
2. Counter-Revolution 
3. An invasion of Taiwan 
4. An invasion of Japan 
5. A joint invitations with North Korea on South Korea
6. A sustained border conflict with India 
7. An invasion in South East Asia 
8. Enforced Sea/Air Dominance in the South Pacific 

Before we talk through these, just keep them in mind as we talk through the changes we are seeing happening in China now. 

So let’s look at just 4 changes: the 96 rifle, tanks, new marine formations, and J-20 fighters. Starting with the QBZ 96 bullpup rifle, this is a very compact rifle design. It is not optimized for full range combat or the rolling hills of Europe like most combat rifles are. Instead, it is one of the smallest silhouettes for a main rifle, making it easier to carry in compact armored vehicles or in tight urban situations. While many Western nations switch from battle rifles to submachine guns in urban settings, the 95 is a compromise design between both. It is also known for its smaller rounds and easier to control kick back. This makes it ideal for poorly trained troops or forces more focused on security, not wide ranging battlefields. It is also the cheapest military rifle in the world right now. This clearly places it in a quantity over quality approach. A skilled marksman and trained soldier would do better with any other battle rifle already in service around the world, but if your limiting factor is guns, not people, then this rifle makes perfect sense. 

So let’s talk tanks. The US has the venerable 55-tons Abrams, the Russia has 46-ton T-90s and the new 58-ton Armadas, Germany and swaths of NATO are using Leopard 2’s at 63-tons, and China… China is focusing on the 33-ton Type-15. 33-tons. Much lighter armor, much smaller gun, and it even carries less ammo. Why? Easier to deploy and requires less fuel… and once again, cheaper to build. This gives the PLA a much lighter footprint than NATO members or Soviet based forces, which would normally lead to heavy losses if they were going head to head against those heavier forces. 

Now I don’t want to present an unbalanced view here to overstate my point. China does have a mix of older, heavier tanks. In fact about 40% of their force is licensed T-54s. You know those old T-62 tanks people are making fun of Russia for using in Ukraine. Well those T-62 were the replacements for the T-54s. China does have a heavier tank called the type-99 which is a mix of reactive armor, long range cannon built around missile-ammo, and a reverse engineered german engine. But even in Chinese doctrine this is seen as not a leading element, but a stand-off element in most cases. It is also a tank design that emphasizes quantity over quality, which make sense for a country trying to leverage their population. Type-99s only make up about 10% of the force. The remaining middle half of the force is some between these two in technology. 

But you know what they are great at? You can drop them from a heavy lift aircraft. Now Taiwan has more than enough SAMs to deal with the easy target that is a heavy lift aircraft, so what is the target for that capacity? Rapid deployment within China. The type 15 can also travel over smaller bridges and more rugged terrain. This is clearly an issue when you look at a map of western China, not Taiwan. It also has its own built in oxygen compressor for very high altitudes and the main cannon, while smaller, has a much larger vertical aim range than most tanks have a need for. This is the ideal tank to take on India over the Himalayas. This is the fastest possible tank for the mountains of south China, deserts of west China, and the second wave of landings in an amphibious operation. This is not a Patton style armor-on-armor option, this is a Hannibal style of heavy forces coming out of places heavy forces should not be able to go. 

The J-20 is China’s new stealth fighter…. all though you have to take that with a grain of salt. Parts of the design were clearly taken from the confirmed theft of F-35 plans and India has already confirmed they can track these without an issue. It is possible that the J-20 have been flying with beacons running or doors open as well as India could just be lying. That said, even if a high powered  ground radar can track the aircraft, there are still situational tactical advantages to having more stealth elements on your plane even if the whole thing is not stealth. 

The real power of the J-20 is two fold: much better range and bigger missile bays. The J-20 is very large for a fighter. It is best to think of it filling a space between a traditional fighter and larger bomb that focuses on missiles. That large size hurts its maneuverability but helps with its flight range due to a much larger fuel capacity. 

That bigger size also allows for a bigger missile bay which also gives China an easier way to catch up on missile tech. Currently, the West has much better missile tech across the board and they have kept missiles down to the traditional sizes, largely because every aircraft wants to grandfather in all of those older specialized missiles made across America and Europe. By giving the J-20 a large bay, China is also upgrading the size of their missiles. This means they carry less of them, but this allows their lower developed but larger missiles to produce results similar to the smaller, more advanced NATO armament.

China runs about 1,900 fighters. Only about 70ish are the new J-20 of 5th generation quality. This is the one everyone likes to talk about but it is in the lowest number in their fleet of aircraft. Another 830 are upper tier 4th generation and are spread between 6 different models made in China, Russia, and upgraded USSR models. These are mostly flanker variants. After that you have 550 J-10s which are a low tier 4th generation fighter which is largely regarded as under performing but was China’s first real attempt to enter into the fighter marketplace. Finally there are about 450 3rd generation fighters still in service. 

China steadily replacing 1960’s aircraft with modern J-20 is a huge improvement, but the balance of the force is still largely 1991 Gulf War in quality and will remain so for at least two decades. This is a great air force for regional point defense and in quantity enough to deal with threats from multiple directions at once. It is a good spearhead for a medium scale invasion. 

These elements, mixed with traditional soviet style equipment, gives us large formations of light units designed around extended ranges or easy of deployment. Now that we have that pinned down, why did China build their forces like that and not like the West or Russia? Let’s walk through those potential operations. 

So the first is the one defense analysts like to talk about the most. And to be fair, this conflict would already have a name: the 4th Taiwan Strait Crisis. Why yes, this would be the 4th one and the previous three happened in 1955, 1958, and 1996. No, this is not new. In my measurement, this is one of two highly likely places for conflict. 

The problem with this analysis is it is the one everyone sees coming so it is the one people on both sides have worked on the most. Expect both sizes to be engaged in counter intelligence and have at least one ace up their sleeve. I can guarantee you China is hiding/over-stating/lying about their offensive capabilities. I can guarantee you Taiwan is hiding/over-stating/lying about their defensive capabilities. If either side is not, then they aren’t doing their job. 

The pendulum in the defense world has swung in favor of defense over offense at the moment. This is something we have seen in Ukraine and something China has peckishly admitted to. 

So lets review those 8 scenarios again

1. Counter-Coup 
2. Counter-Revolution 
3. An invasion of Taiwan 
4. An invasion of Japan 
5. A joint invitations with North Korea on South Korea
6. A sustained border conflict with India 
7. An invasion in South East Asia 
8. Enforced Sea/Air Dominance in the South Pacific 

The forces created on the tank and infantry side are ideal for tasks 1 and 2. They are ideal for 2 because given the quantity they can spread them out to control multiple large areas at once. This also makes it ideal for 1 as getting the whole military involved is incredibly difficult. Having no super heavy, super elite force to act at the king maker, any other larger formation of loyal troops can counter a military coup. Raw army size makes 1 harder and harder.

New Marine Forces would help with 3 and 4 as well as the lighter, faster deployable 2nd wave of light tanks. Maintaining that large fleet of older aircraft gives you an artillery alternative until larger guns can be landed on shore. These changes make sense for a proper invasion force… but they are just not at scale yet. They would need 4 to 5 times as many forces of these types. 

5 and 6 actually also make a lot of sense given the upgrades we have seen. China’s forces will still struggle but those force they are up against are also lighter than most so they line up is more favorable than you would expect in Europe. They have some adapted units now that can help with this very specific situations. Number 7 is really a mix of 3-4 combo and the 5-6 combo. This is now a full capability at scale for China. They have this ability (assuming a small land boarder) and are fully a threat. Politically, I don’t know who they would target this way, but they can if they want to. It is unclear is this is a real objective, a political threat, or the just the side effect of other objectives.

8 best explains what we see happening with China’s air force. This shift in planes and missiles make minimal sense in all the other scenarios but it makes scenes as an anti-US Navy option and really only as an anti-US Navy option. 

So what does all of this mean? China’s air force is tasked with dealing with the US Navy and their army is tasked with dealing with low to mid scale local operations with an emphasis on rapid response over difficult terrain types. The response needed for this is a strong counter play in the air to support the US Navy and then either heavy units already in position on the ground or a large, light, flexible rapid response force to match China’s. Anything outside these purview are defense spending programs you should be highly skeptical of. 

The US Air Forces move on B-21 and the US Marines dropping the tanks and doubling down on rotary makes sense in these contexts. Things like the Abrams-X, penetration divisions, or new nuclear subs, less so.