The Air Force

I’m starting with the Air Force because I think they face the binary choice more clearly that the other forces and have made selections with the clearest bias to one-side. The Air Force is making decisions focused on Great Power War. Their argument is the straight forward. For them peacekeeping is largely about sustained air power for close air support. Any option that increases the number of GPS bombs and rotary cannons available is an improvement.

In 2000, the tactical side of the Air Force was a mix of a small number of F-15Cs (high end air superiority), a very small number of F-15Es (high end strike), large numbers of F-16 (low end dual purpose air superiority and strike), small numbers of B-1s and B-2s (strike, non-close air support), medium numbers of A-10 (anti-armor and close air support), and small numbers of AC-130 (close air support). Note, we actually have used the F-15 models A thru D for air superiority, for simplicity sack I will only be referencing the C model as it is currently the predominate of the 4. Since then most of the F-15c have been replaced with F-22s. The F-35 is set to replace the F-15Es and F-16s, in terms of GPS bombs the F-35 will carry more in these kinds of engagements (not stealth). The B-1B crews begin to train in CAS back in 2002 and in 2008 those aircraft were modified to handle laser guided bombs in addition to the standard GPS bombs for close air support. The newest version of the C-130 can switch from a traditional C-130 to an AC-130 which means instead of a small number of AC-130s the Air Force is able to deploy large numbers of AC-130s. On top of this we also have the addition of the predator drones with Hellfire missiles.

The end results is a massive increase in the number of available of GPS bombs. In this context, the USAF has decided to retire the much loved A-10 to maintain other forces. The hope is that although it is a loss, it will be the minimal possible loss with the additional GPS bombs and the AC-130s and predators filling the rotary cannon gap.

In the A2/AD context it is believed that the AC-130, A-10, Predator, F-16, F-15, and B-1s are vulnerable. Replacing the F-15 and F-16 with F-22 and F-35 addresses those problems with the F-35 providing the bulk of the strike capacity until the A2/AD threat has been removed. This school of thought continues with the argument that in enough numbers, complex, expensive, but highly versatile aircraft like the F-35 with a minimal of more specialized aircraft like the F-22, B-2, and a mix of autonomous options Predators Drones and Cruise Missiles; we will perform both Great Power War and Peacekeeping with the same high-end force.

However there are those who disagree with the Air Forces stances. Although it is accepted that the F-22 is superior to the F-15C and brings tremendous capabilities to battlefield, it is also worth noting that the F-15C has over 100 air to air kills and has yet to be shot down. Those kills are spread across not only the US in Desert Storm (30+ kills) but also earlier versions of the F-15 used by Israel (50+ kills from 79 to 82). Given the great expense of the F-22 and the resulting limitations from Congress on purchases, this means we are transitioning from a fleet of 800 F-15Cs to one of 186 F-22. In fact of the 20 air superiority squadrons we run today, only 12 squadrons were transitioned to the new F-22 while 8 squadrons remain flight the venerable F-15C. There is a similar story in terms of trading quantity for quality with the transition to F-35. The 1,700 new F-35 will be replacing 2,500 F-16, 120 F-15E, and 300 A-10.

Those who hold that peacekeeping is a critical mission set for the US Military truly hate and greatly disagree with the retirement of the A-10. It is a low cost, high-powered aircraft that can provide a unique, high-powered rotary cannon for close air support possible for the troops on the ground. Many of these critics point to the Gulf War where we grounded the A-10 for the opening weeks due to the anti-air threat but after those Iraqi A2/AD elements were targeted and destroyed the A-10s took to the air and wreaked havoc on Iraqi armor.

It is worth noting that our Air Force has been very busy in the last 3 decades. They have had two air wars in Iraq, steady operations in Afghanistan, and NATO operations in Kosovo and Libya. We have a number of aircraft that are veterans of five wars. Aircraft do wear out have do have to be replaced. New stocks of F-15C, F-16, and A-10 would be needed even if we were not upgrading to F-22s and F-35s.

What should the force structure of the US Military be?

This has always been a difficult topic for a number of reasons, primary it centers on an unanswerable question: what will the next war look like? There are generally two approaches to answering this question. The first is to look back at history and try to derive out a pattern. The second is to look to possible near-term adversaries and ask what it will take to overcome them.

In the case of the US military these approaches have led to two very different camps in term of military force structure. The first group talks about a military that can perform “operations other than war.” This is counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency AKA COIN, and traditional peace keeping. Politicians and military leaders hate the terms “peacekeeping” and “nation building.” But take a hard look at the day-to-day patrols during the Vietnam War, US anti-drug operations in Guatemala and Columbia, Somalia in 1993, the NATO air-wars in Kosovo and Libya, our decade plus in Afghanistan, and Iraq the 2^nd time around post “mission accomplished.” Our reconstruction plans post-WWII in both Germany and Japan required lots of funding and US Army bases on site.

Politicians say they don’t want to do peacekeeping, military commanders say they don’t want to do peacekeeping, but time and time again politicians find themselves asking military commander to go do peacekeeping in one form or another. No one likes it but no one has liked it for the past 68 years. This is not going anywhere. It will happen again. We owe it to our soldiers and other service members to accept the unhappy truth and make sure they are prepared to do it and do it well.

The second group looks to near competitors and is all about what is known as Great Power War. In the current environment that means a focus on A2AD (Anti-Access, Area Denial). These experts are looking at the anti-air and anti-ship missiles of nations like Russia and China. They are seeing the addition of sea mines and cyber-attacks. They are also seeing Iran training with swarms of smaller ships, a more quantity over quality approach to naval warfare.

America has dominance in the ability to project power and strike targets. The goal of A2AD is 2 fold:

• Cause high casualties to striking forces. In many cases A2AD assets are not enough to outright win in an open war, however they are enough to ensure a significant cost if there is an engagement
• Strike assets will need to function at a longer range and with greater limitations. The effect of this means some strike assets will be outside their range thus sidelined while others will have to take on significant additional risks while deployed.

Part of the A2AD conversation is to make sure policy makers understand that the strike power seen both times in Iraq cannot be replicated against certain nations due to their A2AD capabilities. It is also critical to understand different military assets have different levels of exposure to A2AD capabilities.

The optimal force for peacekeeping and the optimal force for great power war can be diametrically opposed in many ways. Peacekeeping thrives on low tech solutions, requires stay power over the long runs, and having both international and political partners are not only critical but may be more critical than the military force being deployed. Great Power War requires multiple specialized high tech solutions, a burst of forces in large numbers but only for the short term, and although international and political partners are helpful, it is the military force that determines what is happening on the ground.

People on the peacekeeping side tend argue that their mission is the most likely, which is historically true. Those on the Great Power War side argue that their mission is the deadliest/hardest, which is also historically true, and thus the standard we should prepare against. Given these two differing viewpoints, each of the service find themselves being pulled in two-different direction at once in a time when resources are sequestered, older equipment is worn out due to extended campaigns, and all services are in a “reset” phase.

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Next week I will be applying these two viewpoints to specific military branches.