Welcome back, this time for the third and final installment on this topic. If you missed the first two they are here and here.

I don’t have anything new to say in regards to US economic power in the Pacific. We are highly interdependent with Asia and everyone reading this has heard that at least a dozen times a year for a decade or more. If you don’t believe it then just look at the items around you. For myself, I’m writing this on a Samsung laptop, while drinking imported green tea, having driven here in my Kia. As I stated at the start of these posts, the economic aspect of the rebalance to Asia is less about the future and more about catching up to our past. So once again: is the US making a rebalance to Asia? No, we are not rebalancing because we are already there and have been there for some time.

If it sound like I’m being harsh toward this rebalance or playing down its importance I assure you I am not. Let’s talk about the third arm of US power: diplomatic. At the start of the Cold War we formed NATO to address the threat from the USSR. It was a tight diplomatic/military alliance with strict responses from all members if any members were attacked by the USSR. The Washington response to a problem is the NATO response. The London response to a problem is the NATO response. The Brussels response to problem is the NATO response.

Is the Tokyo response to China the same as the Seoul response to China?

Maybe?  Probably? Not necessarily? Regardless of which of the previous answers you choose, how sure are you of that answer?

The politics of the Pacific are far more complex than those in Europe of the 1950’s. As an ally, Europe has proven to be highly skilled at developing institutions, forums, and international bodies. These can be very useful in addressing issues or at a minimum make a joint statement about what a solution should look like.

The Pacific is highly disjointed. While Europe might have spats between its regional bodies, the Pacific lacks many of those kinds of bodies to begin with. Organizations like ASEAN have proven to be the exception instead of the rule. In the case of ASEAN, in has a large membership but mostly of the smaller players. The large powers like South Korea, Japan, and Australia lack memberships in regional bodies that allow for the kinds of cooperation, dispute resolution, and joint statements that are sorely needed for soft power to work.

Many of the divisions and security issues in the Pacific are solvable and we have seen these kinds of issues turned into minor technical details or settlements between European nations participating in larger institutions while all their other neighbor were looking on.

Of course there are additional complications and ambiguities in East Asia today when compared to a post WWII Europe. Is the rise of China a threat to East Asia equal to what the USSR was to Europe? For many nations China is both a military concern and an economic opportunity. China’s sea claims have cause even Vietnam to request American military help. If these concerns are true do we need a PATO (Pacific Alliance Treaty Organization) much like we have NATO?

Due to governance issues and demographics, many see China as a rising power but only in the medium term with India following soon behind it but is a sustainable manner. These analysts see India passing China in dominance starting around 2030. If this is the case, should our rebalance in Asia be built around an Indian Ocean nation instead of a Pacific nation?

What about Taiwan? There are significant pros and cons to both including them in any process as well as leaving them out of any process.

This is where I completely agree with President Obama and the rebalance to Asia. In terms of military and economic power this rebalance is not a rebalance, it is a classification change at best and misleading statement on resource distribution at worse. In terms of diplomatic institutions and the State Department’s priorities it is a long overdue call to action. We need a massive push for institution creation and clarity in the Pacific and later across Asia as a whole. I have to contritely call this a “diplomatic surge” simply because of the abuses the word “surge” has received in the current lexicon but it is also an accurate phrase and this diplomatic surge would prevent many fixable problems if it could be achieved.

What makes this surge odd is that it can’t have an objective in mind, at least not in the early stages. The fact of the matter is this situation is murky enough that a clear and present danger is not fully agreed upon by all and there is still great mistrust between necessary players. We can’t walk in and demand a PATO or expanded ASEAN or India/Japan centric alliance with lesser partners attached or any other predetermined structure.

The best approach will most likely to be multifaceted, creating and supporting a mix of organizations; however at some point a lead organization will need to be determined. If a lead organization can be determined, even if imperfect, it forces others to play along within that framework or proactively seek a bilateral agreements outside of that framework.

The rebalance to Asia is a diplomatic necessity. We do not need to see more soldiers in fatigues but more diplomats in suits. We can measure its success not by increasing the N strength of destroyers or fighter jets but by counting the number of regional organizations and the number of times we see nations using the same language to describe specific issues. If we only see a few more troops then this shift is no more than a classification change to describe actions that have been happening for decades.

Well, a classification change and a missed opportunity for America to do some good.

I hope to see you all at the beginning of next month for a completely different topic.